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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the scal policy e¤ects on labor market
conditions, employing an array of structural vector autoregressive models for
the post-war U.S. data from 1960:I to 2017:II. Fiscal spending shocks increase
jobs in the government sector at the cost of private sector jobs, resulting in net
losses to the total employment. Private wages increase insignicantly in the
short-run, while government wages rise signicantly and persistently in response
to the scal shock. Consequently, the wage gap across the two sectors widens
in response to the scal shock. The wage shock yields signicantly positive
responses of corporate prots in the long-run as it enhances productivity, which
supports wage-led growth models. On the other hand, I report negligible in-
sample and out-of-sample predictive contents for private jobs and wages from
corporate prots, meaning that theres virtually no evidence of the trickle-down
e¤ect, which is essential for prot-led growth models.
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1 Introduction
The sluggish recovery from the recent Great Recession has revived the debate on the
e¤ectiveness of the scal policy in stimulating economic activity among the economics
profession. Can increases in government spending help promote economic activity in
the private sector? And if so, will key variables of interest such as consumption, in-
vestment, employment, and real wages respond persistently positively to expansionary
scal policy? These questions has led to a large literature on this issue.
Some researchers are fairly optimistic about the role of government stimulus. They
report overall positive responses of consumption, real wages, and output to expansion-
ary government spending shocks, which are roughly in line with the New Keynesian
macroeconomic model, even though replications of empirical ndings can be di¢ cult
unless their models are heavily restricted. See, among others, Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1992), Devereux, Head, and Laphan (1996), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007).
On the other hand, another group of scholars provides strong evidence of negative
responses of consumption and real wages to scal spending shocks. See, for example,
Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), Hall (1986), Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2012), and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
Ramey (2011b) points out that these responses reect a negative wealth e¤ect that of-
ten appears in the neoclassical macroeconomic model such as Aiyagari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993). Increases in government spending
may result in a negative wealth e¤ect because the government has to raise tax in the
future to nance the decits. Rational consumers respond to it by reducing consump-
tion and increase labor supply. Overall, empirical evidence on the e¤ectiveness of scal
stimulus is mixed.1
It should be noted that much of the attention in the literature has focused on
the e¤ects of the scal policy on the gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption,
1One closely related issue is on the possibility of the asymmetric e¤ects of the government spending
shock. That is, scal policy may become more e¤ective in the presence of slacks during recessions.
Again, empirical evidence is again mixed. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Bachman and Sims
(2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), and Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2015) report higher scal
multipliers in a regime of a low economic activity than those in a high regime activity, whereas
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), Ramey and Zubairy (2014), and Kim and Jia (2017) nd no
such evidence. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) reports a larger spending multiplier when
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds.
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whereas much less attention was paid to its e¤ects on labor market conditions, although
policy-makers seems to have focused more on the latter in their e¤orts to combat the
Great Recession.2
Some research works report a positive scal policy e¤ect on employment as a by-
product of its output e¤ects. See, among others, Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004). In contrast, some focused on its direct e¤ects on labor
market variables. Finn (1998) demonstrates an increase in government jobs could result
in a decrease in private sector employment. Cavallo (2005) proposes a similar model but
with a dampened negative e¤ect on consumption as the government spending for public
employment serves as a transfer for households. Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010)
report more benecial e¤ects of the scal policy on an array of labor market variables.
Overall, the labor market e¤ects of scal policy have been somewhat overlooked in the
current literature, and we attempt to ll the gap.
In this paper, we investigate the scal policy e¤ects on labor market variables in
the U.S. using an array of recursively identied vector autoregressive (VAR) models,
similar to the one by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), for the post-war macroeconomic
data. Unlike Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010), we distinguish the key labor market
variables in the private sector from those in the government sector. Unlike Finn (1998)
and Cavallo (2005), we focus on empirical evidence of the scal policy e¤ects on labor
market conditions. Our major ndings are as follows.
First, government spending shocks are not e¤ective in stimulating private activ-
ity. The private gross domestic product that excludes government spending responds
negatively to the scal spending shock. Furthermore, its negative responses eventu-
ally dominate increases in the government spending. Second, scal spending shocks
increase government jobs at the expense of private employment. Private and govern-
ment wages both rise in response to expansionary scal policy, although increases in
private wages are overall insignicant. Government wages rise signicantly and per-
sistently. Third, corporate prots have virtually no role in improving the labor market
conditions, meaning that theres not much evidence of the so-called trickle-down e¤ect
2The U.S. Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) in
February 2009. The Recovery Act was signed into law by then-President Barack Obama one week
later on February 17, 2009. In addition to extensive economic stimulus programs, the laws primary
objective was to create new employment opportunities as well as saving existing jobs. For instance,
$275 billion out of the total $787 billion funding was allocated in federal contracts, grants, and loans
that hired new sta¤s in the public agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Food and Drug Administration. In addition, $224 billion was allocated for extended unemployment
benets, education and health care.
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that is crucial for prot-led economic growth models. Also, increases in productivity
have limited e¤ects in enhancing labor market conditions.
Lastly, we corroborate these in-sample evidence with an array of out-of-sample fore-
casting exercises that statistically evaluate predictive contents of key macroeconomic
variables for wages and employment in the future. Government spending seems to have
substantial and signicant out-of-sample predictive contents for employment. Private
GDP contains some useful information for dynamics of wages and jobs in the future.
On the contrary, corporate prots have virtually no predictive contents for jobs and
wages, which is again at odds with implications of the trickle-down e¤ect. Again, pro-
ductivity provides limited information for out-of-sample prediction of private jobs and
wages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our VAR
models and out-of-sample forecast schemes. In Section 3, we present data descriptions
and our major empirical ndings. We also report an array of robustness check ana-
lyses and simulation exercises. Section 4 reports our out-of-sample forecasting exercise
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Econometric Model
We employ the following vector autoregressive (VAR) model.
xt = 
0dt +
pX
j=1
Ajxt j + Cut; (1)
where
xt = [gt yt labt it mt]
0;
dt is a vector of deterministic terms that includes an intercept and time trend, C is a
lower-triangular matrix, and ut is a vector of mutually orthonormal structural shocks,
that is, Eutu
0
t = I. gt denotes the real federal government consumption and gross
investment spending per capita, yt is the real GDP per capita, labt is the labor market
variable, it is the e¤ective federal funds rate, and mt denotes the monetary base.
We are particularly interested in the j-period ahead orthogonalized impulse-response
functions (OIRF) dened as follows.
IRF (j) = E (xt+jjuk;t = 1;
t 1)  E (xt+jj
t 1) ; (2)
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where uk;t is the structural shock to the kth variable in (1) and 
t 1 is the adaptive
information set at time t  1.3
We also consider the private real GDP per capita (pgdpt) for yt in (1), which does
not include the total government consumption and gross investment. For labt, we
employ one of the following four labor market condition variables: private sector wages
(pwt), government sector wages (gwt), private sector employment (pjt), and government
sector employment (gjt).
Note that gt is ordered rst in (1), meaning that gt is not contemporaneously
inuenced by innovations in other variables within one quarter. This assumption is
often employed in the current literature (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Ramey
[2011a]), because implementations of discretionary scal policy actions normally require
Congressional approvals, which take longer than one quarter. On the other hand, the
money market variables, it and mt, are ordered last. This is because the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) can revise the stance of monetary policy via regular and
emergency meetings whenever it is necessary. it is ordered before mt because the Fed
targets the interest rate and the monetary base responds endogenously.
It is well documented that econometric inferences from recursively identied VAR
models may not be robust to alternative VAR ordering. However, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (1999) show that impulse-response functions can be invariant when
the location of the shocking variable is xed. It turns out that all response functions to
the scal spending shocks are numerically identical even when one randomly rearranges
the variables next to gt.4 Therefore, our key ndings presented in this paper are robust
to alternative ordering.
In addition to the VAR model (1) for in-sample analysis, we employ the following
autoregressive (AR) type out-of-sample forecasting model to study the predictive con-
tents for labor market variables in other macroeconomic variables zt. For this purpose,
we use the following j-period ahead AR(1)-type prediction model. Abstracting from
deterministic terms, the benchmark forecasting model is,
labt+j = jlabt + ut+j; j = 1; 2; ::; k; (3)
where j is less than one in absolute value for stationarity. Note that we employ a
3That is, the information set has the following property, 
t 1  
t 2  
t 3    .
4Similarly, all response functions to monetary policy shocks stay identical even if the variables
before the monetary variables are randomly reshu­ ed.
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direct forecasting approach by regressing labt+j on the current value labt. It should
be also noted that j coincides with the AR(1) persistence parameter (1 = ) when
j = 1.5 The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for (3) yields the following j-period
ahead forecast from this benchmark AR-type model.
labBMt+jjt = ^jlabt (4)
We propose the following competing model that extends (3) with a predictor vari-
able zt.
labt+j = jlabt + jzt + ut+j; j = 1; 2; ::; k (5)
Applying the OLS estimator for (5), we obtain the following j-period ahead forecast
for the target variable from this competing model,
labCt+jjt = ^jlabt + ^jzt (6)
Note that the competing model (5) nests the stationary benchmark model (3) when zt
does not contain any useful predictive contents for labt+j, that is, j = 0.
We implement out-of-sample forecast exercises, employing a xed-size rolling win-
dow method that performs better than recursive methods in the presence of a structural
break.
We rst estimate the coe¢ cients in our forecasting models (3) and (5) using the
initial T0 < T observations, flabt; ztgT0t=1, then obtain the j period ahead out-of-sample
forecast for the target variable, labT0+j by (4) or (6). Next, we move the sample period
of the data forward by adding one more observation to the sample but dropping one
earliest observation, flabt; ztgT0+1t=2 , then re-estimate the coe¢ cients for the next round
forecast for labT0+j+1. Note that we maintain the same number of observations (T0)
throughout the whole exercises. We repeat until we forecast the last observation,
labT . We implement this scheme for up to 12 quarter (3 years) forecast horizons,
j = 1; 2; :::; 12.
For evaluations of the out-of-sample prediction accuracy, we use the ratio of the
5For j > 1, j = j and ut+j = "t+j + "t+j 1 + :::+ j 1"t+1, where "t is a white noise process.
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root mean square prediction error (RRMSPE) dened as follows,
RRMSPE(j) =
r
1
T T0 j
PT
t=T0+j

uBMt+jjt
2
r
1
T T0 j
PT
t=T0+j

uCt+jjt
2 ; (7)
where
uBMt+jjt = labt+j   labBMt+jjt; uCt+jjt = labt+j   labCt+jjt (8)
Note that our competing model outperforms the benchmark model when RRMSPE is
greater than 1.
We supplement our analyses by employing the Diebold-Mariano-West (DMW ) test.
See Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996). For this, we dene the following
loss function,
dt = (u
BM
t+jjt)
2   (uCt+jjt)2; (9)
where the squared loss function can be replaced by the absolute value loss function.
The DMW statistic is dened as follows to test the null of equal predictive accuracy,
that is, H0 : Edt = 0,
DMW (j) =
dq
[Avar( d)
; (10)
where d is the sample average, d = 1
T T0 j
PT
t=T0+j
dt, and [Avar( d) denotes the asymp-
totic variance of d,
[Avar( d) =
1
T   T0
qX
i= q
k(i; q) ^i;
where k() is a kernel function with the bandwidth parameter q, and  ^i is the ith
autocovariance function estimate.
It is known that the asymptotic distribution of the DMW statistics does not follow
the standard normal distribution when the competing model nests the benchmark one
as in our case. Therefore, we use the critical values from McCracken (2007) that re-
centers the distribution of the test statistics to acquire asymptotically correct critical
values.
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3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Data Descriptions
We obtained all data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Observations
are quarterly frequency and span from 1960:I to 2017:II.
The private GDP (pyt) is the total GDP (yt) minus the total government consump-
tion and gross investment spending (tgt). That is, tgt include the federal government
spending (gt) as well as those of the state and local governments. All income/spending
variables are log-transformed and are expressed in real per capita terms using the
GDP deator and total population. The money market variables are the e¤ective fed-
eral funds rate (EFFR, it) and the monetary base (MB, mt), which are used to control
the e¤ect of monetary policy.
The private wage (pwt) is the total compensation in the private sector (A132RC1Q027SBEA)
divided by the GDP deator and the number of employees in the total private industries
(USPRIV; pjt). The government sector wage (gwt) denotes the total compensation in
the government sector (B202RC1Q027SBEA) divided by the GDP deator and the
number of employees in the government (USGOVT; gjt). In addition to the private
sector jobs (pjt) and the government sector jobs (gjt), we also use the total nonfarm
employment (PAYEMS; tjt) in our baseline VAR models.
The corporate prots (prft) is the nominal corporate prots after tax (CP) divided
by the GDP deator, which is log-transformed. We consider the following two measures
of productivity (prdt): real output per person in nonfarm business sector (OPHNFB)
and real output per hour of all persons in nonfarm business sector (PRS85006163).
Both are log-transformed and yielded similar results, so we report ndings with the
second measure of productivity.
Figure 1 reports time series graphs of key macroeconomic data in panel (a) and of
labor market variables in panel (b). All variables exhibit an upward trend over time. In
order to check the business cycle properties of the data, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) lter to the data with a smoothing parameter of 1,600 for quarterly data. Figure
2 reports the cyclical components along with the NBER recession dates marked in
shaded areas.
By construction, the real GDP per capita (yt) tends to decrease (increase) when
the economy enters a downturn (boom) phase. The federal government spending (gt)
often exhibits counter-cyclical movements, reecting stabilization policies that are im-
8
plemented by the federal government. The corporate prots and the real hourly output
(productivity) tend to show procyclical dynamics. Private wages and jobs overall ex-
hibit comovements and are procyclical, while government wages and jobs often increase
during economic downturns. It should be noted that the wage gap (gwt pwt) and the
job ratio (gjt   pjt) show strong counter-cyclical movements. That is, the wage gap
and the job ratio tends to rise rapidly during economic downturns. In what follows,
we show that these changes can be explained by expansionary government spending
shocks.
Figures 1 and 2 around here
3.2 VAR Analysis
This subsection reports an array of the impulse-response function estimates based on
(1) and (2) along with the one standard deviation condence bands that are generated
from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations. We rst report responses of the real
GDP variables (yt and pyt) to the scal spending shock (gt) in Figure 3 based on
xt = [gt pyt tjt it mt]
0 and xt = [gt yt tjt it mt]0, where tjt is the total nonfarm
employment.
One notable nding is that the government spending (gt) shock is ine¤ective in
stimulating private activity (pyt). The initial increase in the real GDP (yt) is driven
mainly by the increase in the government spending because the private spending barely
responds to the shock in the short-run. Eventually, the real GDP responses become
negligible as the private GDP declines, cancelling out the increase in the government
spending.6
Figure 3 around here
In Figure 4, we report scal policy e¤ects on key labor market variables. As can
be seen in the upper panel (a), the government spending shock has a statistically
6The monetary policy shock, identied by a negative ( ) 1% shock to the EFFR (it), generates
a signicant stimulus e¤ect on the private GDP. The response of the total GDP is weaker (in per-
cent) than that of the private GDP, which implies that the monetary policy shock stimulates private
spending not the government spending. All results are available upon requests.
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signicant positive e¤ect only on the government sector wages (gwt). Its e¤ect on the
private sector wages (pwt) is statistically insignicant, although its point estimates stay
positive for about 2 years. The wage gap (gwt pwt) responds positively, meaning that
public sector workers are more likely to benet from scal policy shocks.
It turns out that these responses are closely related with those of employment in
the private and the government sectors that are reported in the lower panel (b). In
response to the government spending shock, private jobs (pjt) declines signicantly for
about 4 years, while government sector jobs (gjt) increase signicantly for over a year.
It should be noted that these responses are likely to occur when the government
implements value-added type policy instead of government purchases. That is, when
the government hires more workers, private sector labor may move to the government
sector, which results in a decrease in the labor supply in the private sector. Strong
demand in the government labor market raises the government wages, while a decrease
in the labor supply in the private sector also increases the private wages.7
Figures 4 around here
We noticed that the scal policy has not been quite successful in improving the
labor market condition. We next investigate how other economic variables inuence
the labor market condition. The rst variable we consider is the after-tax corporate
prot (prft), motivated by the so-called trickle-down e¤ect that often appear in prot-
led growth models. These models claim that labor market condition would improve
when businesses prosper because the strong demand for labor generates more jobs and
higher wages.
In response to the 1% corporate prot shock, private wages respond signicantly
positively for about a year. See Figure 5. However, its responses are quantitatively
weak and short-lived, which implies a very limited support for the trickle-down e¤ect
in the U.S.8
It should be noted, however, that the corporate prot (prft) rises signicantly
in the long-run in response to a 1% private wage shock, although it initially decreases
7Monetary policy tends to strengthen labor market conditions in both sectors. Expansionary
monetary policy stimulates private spending that creates the stronger labor demand in the private
sector. As the economy grows, the demand for public services also grows, then labor market conditions
in the public sector improve endogenously.
8This might happen if corporate prots are likely to be distributed to share holders as dividends
or to be kept as retained earnings.
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reecting higher manufacturing costs. One explanation may be found from statistically
signicant positive responses of the productivity (prdt) to a private wage shock. See
Figure 6. That is, higher wages in the private sector may improve working environment,
thus increase labor productivity, then contributes to higher corporate prots in the
long-run. Note that these responses are consistent with the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis.9
Private wages respond signicantly positively for less than 2 years when the pro-
ductivity shock occurs, implying that workers garner a limited amount of benets of
higher productivity.
Figures 5 and 6 around here
3.3 Robustness Check
This sub-section reports an array of robustness check analysis. We rst investigate
the stability of our key VAR ndings over time. Among others, we are particularly
interested in scal policy e¤ects on labor market variables in Figure 4.
For this, I employ a 30-year rolling window scheme to repeatedly estimate the
impulse-response functions over di¤erent sample periods. I start with estimations of the
impulse-response functions using the rst 30-year long data. Then, I moved the sample
period forward by adding one new observation but dropping one oldest observation,
which is used to obtain the second set of the impulse-response functions. I repeat until
I estimate the response functions using the last 30-year long data.
Graphs in Figure 7 show fairly consistent sets of the impulse-response function
estimates. In response to the scal spending shock, private jobs (pjt) decrease then
recover in two or more years. Total employment (tjt) exhibits similar responses, mean-
ing that increases in government jobs (gjt) are dominated by decreases in private jobs.
Private wages (pwt) rise a little, whereas government wages (gwt) rise more substan-
tially.
Figure 7 around here
9They are also consistent with the so-called wage-led economic growth model.
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Next, we implement the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVDEC) analysis
for private sector wages and jobs. The purpose of this exercise is to measure the
further in-sample evidence of the trickle-down e¤ect. When the business condition
improves and corporate prots rise, workers may be able to share the gains eventually.
In panel (a) of Figure 8, I report the share of corporate prot shock in explaining the
total variation of private wages or jobs in up to 5 years. In addition to the corporate
prot shock, I also added the real GDP shock as another explanatory variable, and
the remaining explanatory power is assumed to be due to the private wage shock as
residuals.
Surprisingly, corporate prots have virtually no explanatory power for future private
wages in all forecast horizons we consider. On the other hand, the share of the real
GDP continuously rise up to almost 50% in 5 years. Similarly, corporate prots have
negligible explanatory power for private jobs in all forecast horizons.
In panel (b), we implement a similar FEVDEC analysis to measure the role of pro-
ductivity in explaining private labor market conditions. It turns out that productivity
has virtually no explanatory power for future private wages in all forecast horizons.
However, it has some (15 to 20%) explanatory power for private jobs.
These ndings again imply very limited evidence of the trickle-down e¤ect. Private
wages fail to benet from increases in corporate prots. Higher productivity seems to
generate jobs in the private sector but fails to generate higher wages. In addition to
these in-sample evidence, we further investigate the validity of the trickle-down e¤ect
employing the out-of-sample forecasting framework in Section 4.
Figure 8 around here
3.4 Simulation Exercises
In this subsection, I report simple simulation exercise results based on my VAR impulse-
response function estimates presented earlier. Figures 9 and 10 show the new equilib-
rium path of the labor variables in response to a 1% federal government spending shock.
Light solid lines are the point estimates that are accompanied by 95% condence bands
(dashed lines). Dark solid lines are the dynamic path with deterministic time trends
with no structural shocks.
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Private jobs fall signicantly below the deterministic time trend line when the scal
spending shock occurs. The job losses reach over 12 millions of jobs in about 3 years in
annual rate as can be seen in Table 1. Government jobs signicantly increase above the
trend line only for a short period of time, and eventually are dominated by decreases
in private jobs.
Private wages rise for about 2 and a half year, then declines below the trend.
Overall, the responses of private wages are statistically insignicant. On the other
hand, government wages increase highly signicantly for over 5 years. Increases in
government wages are substantial and overall dominate the decreases in private wages
in longer term, widening the wage gap between the two sectors.
Figures 9 and 10 around here
Table 1 around here
4 Out-of-Sample Forecast Exercises
This section investigates what variables contain predictive contents for our key labor
market variables under the out-of-sample forecasting framework described earlier in
Section 2. For this purpose, we employ the model (5) that augments an AR(1) type
benchmark prediction model (3) of the labor market variable (labt) with an extra
predictor of interest (zt) to see whether zt provides additional predictive power to the
benchmark model.
We consider the following four labor market variables for labt: private jobs (pjt),
government jobs (gjt), private wages (pwt), and government wages (gwt). For the
predictor variable (zt), we use the government spending (gt), corporate prots (prft),
productivity (prdt), and the private GDP (pyt). We report the RRMSPE and the
DMW statistics for each exercise in Tables 2 and 3.
As can be seen in Table 2, gt contains strong out-of-sample predictive contents for pjt
in all forecast horizons. RRMSPE statistics are greater than one for all cases, meaning
that the competing model (5) outperforms the benchmark model (3). DMW statistics
are also consistent with the RRMSPE. It rejects the null of equal predictability for 11
out of 12 forecast horizons at the 5% signicance level, and for 12 out of 12 at the
10% level. gt also has signicant predictive contents for gjt in the short-run for up to
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1 year. These out-of-sample ndings corroborate our earlier in-sample evidence that
scal policy tends to strengthen the public job market at the expense of private jobs.
Other variables add a lot weaker performance in our out-of-sample forecast exer-
cises. prft and pyt have additional predictive contents only in a few cases. That is,
I fail to nd out-of-sample evidence in favor of the trickle-down e¤ect, which corrob-
orates my previous in-sample evidence. prdt seems to have stronger performance in
the medium-run than prft and pyt for pjt. Interestingly, pyt seems to have substan-
tial predictive contents for gjt, which implies that the demand for government services
increases as the economy ourishes.
Table 2 around here
Table 3 reports the RRMSPE and DMW statistics for wage variables, pwt and gwt.
gt and prft add virtually no additional predictive contents for private wages (pwt),
which again implies virtually no evidence of the trickle-down e¤ect. prdt and pyt have
some predictive contents for it in the long-run and in the short-run, respectively. For
government sector wages (gwt), I nd very limited or virtually no predictive contents
from all variables we consider. gt does not have much out-of-sample predictive contents
for gwt, although it does an important role in explaining gwt in previous in-sample
analysis. In a nutshell, these predictor variables play very weak roles in forecasting
wage dynamics in the near future.
Table 3 around here
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates empirical evidence of the scal policy e¤ects on labor market
conditions, employing an array of VAR models for the post-war U.S. macroeconomic
data. In response to the scal spending shock, government jobs increase signicantly
at the expense of private jobs, which implies a possibility of government value-added
shocks instead of government purchase shocks. Government wages rise more persist-
ently and signicantly, whereas increases in private wages die out quickly.
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Corporate prots have negligible e¤ects on private wages, which provides strong
empirical evidence against the trickle-down e¤ect. Increases in productivity have sig-
nicantly positive e¤ect on private wages only in the short-run. On the other hand,
positive wage shocks in the private sector increase corporate prots in the long-run,
reecting signicant productivity improvement in response to the wage shock. Our
robustness check analysis via the FEVDEC and sub-sample analysis overall conrms
these ndings. We also implement simulation exercises to numerically assess how wages
and jobs evolve over time in response to the scal spending shock in comparison with
the dynamic path with no structural shocks. Results imply that the scal shock shrinks
private sector employment substantially, while government wages rise signicantly and
substantially, widening the wage gap between the two sectors.
In addition to the in-sample analysis, I implement an array of out-of-sample fore-
casting exercises that evaluate the importance of predictive contents in key macroeco-
nomic variables for labor market variables in the future. Government spending contains
useful information for predicting private employment dynamics in all forecast horizons
as well as government jobs in the short-run. Corporate prots have virtually no predict-
ive contents for any labor market condition variables, conrming theres no evidence for
the trickle-down e¤ect. Productivity and real GDP contain some limited information
for predicting wages and jobs.
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Figure 1. The Data
(a) Macroeconmic Data
(b) Labor Market Data
Note: All data are log-transformed. Real GDP, government spending, private wage, and
government wage are expressed in real per capita terms. Corporate profits are also in
real terms.
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Figure 2. Business Cycle Components of the Data
(a) Macroeconmic Data
(b) Labor Market Data
Note: We employed the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the business cycle component
from the data. We use a conventional smoothing parameter of 1,600 for quarterly data.
The wage gap is defined as the log government sector wage minus the log private sector
wage. The job ratio is the log government sector employment minus the log private sector
employment.
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Figure 3. Fiscal Policy Effects on the Real Gross Domestic Product
Note: Prior to estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with up to a
quadratic time trend. The first panel reports response function estimates to a 1% posi-
tive shock to the government consumption and gross investment (gt). Dashed lines are
1 standard deviation confidence intervals obtained from 500 nonparametric bootstrap
simulations.
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Figure 4. Fiscal Policy Effects on Labor Market Conditions
(a) Wage Effects
(b) Employment Effects
Note: We estimate the impulse-response function with the total GDP. The wage gap is
defined as the log government sector wage minus the log private sector wage. The job ratio
is the log government sector employment minus the private sector employment. Prior to
estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with up to a quadratic time
trend. We report response function estimates to a 1% positive shock to the government
consumption and gross investment (gt). Dashed lines are 1 standard deviation confidence
intervals obtained from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 5. Corporate Profits and Wages
Note: We estimate the impulse-response function based on x
′
t= [gt, yt, pwt, prf t, it, mt]
′
.
Prior to estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with up to a quadratic
time trend. The first figure is the response function estimates of the private wages (pwt)
to a 1% positive shock to the corporate profits after tax (prf t). The second figure is the
response of the corporate profits after tax (prf t)to a 1% positive shock to the real wage
in the private sector (pwt). Dashed lines are 1 standard deviation confidence intervals
obtained from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 6. Productivity and Real Wages
Note: We estimate the impulse-response function based on x
′
t= [gt, yt, prdt, pwt, it, mt]
′
.
Prior to estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with up to a quadratic
time trend. The first figure is the response function estimates of the private wages (pwt)
to a 1% positive shock to the productivitiy (prdt). The second figure is the response
of the productivity (prdt)to a 1% positive shock to the real wage in the private sec-
tor (pwt).Dashed lines are 1 standard deviation confidence intervals obtained from 500
nonparametric bootstrap simulations..
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Figure 7. 30-Year Fixed Rolling Window Analysis
(a) Government Spending Shock Effects on Jobs
(b) Government Spending Shock Effects on Wages
Note: We estimate the impulse-response function to the government spending shock with
the total GDP. Prior to estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with up
to a quadratic time trend. We repeat the same estimation using the 30-year (120 quarters)
fixed-size rolling window scheme. That is, we begin the estimation utilizing observations
from 1960Q1 to 1989Q4, and repeat estimations by adding one new observation and
dropping one oldest observation, maintaining 120 observations. We repeat until the last
estimation is done with the data from 1988Q3 to 2017Q2.
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Figure 8. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analysis
(a) Share of Corporate Profits
(b) Share of Productivity
Note: We estimate the forecast error variance decomposition for the labor variable in the
private sector, that is, x
′
t= [yt, pwt, prf t]
′
, [yt, pjt, prf t]
′
, [yt, prdt, pwt]
′
, and
[ yt, prdt, pjt]
′
. Prior to estimations, all variables were demeaned and detrended with
up to a quadratic time trend. The first panel reports shares of the forecast error variance
of the corporate profits for labor variables up to 5-year forecast horizons. The second
panel provides shares of the forecast error variance of the productivity variable for labor
variables up to 5-year forecast horizons.
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Figure 9. Simulation Exercises: Employment Effects
(a) Private Jobs
(b) Government Jobs
Note: We simulate the gains or losses of employment in each sector in response to the 1%
fiscal spending shock by the new dynamic path point estimate minus deterministic path
with no structural shocks.
27
Figure 10. Simulation Exercises: Wage Effects
(a) Private Wages
(b) Government Wages
Note: We simulate the gains or losses of employment in each sector in response to the 1%
fiscal spending shock by the new dynamic path point estimate minus deterministic path
with no structural shocks.
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Table 1. Gains or Losses to the 1% Fiscal Spending Shock
j (year) pjobt gjobt pwagt gwagt
0.25 1, 257 1, 013 401 4, 020
0.50 −2, 371 951 1, 987 2, 950
0.75 −5, 466 959 1, 267 3, 910
1.00 −7, 933 967 1, 166 4, 600
1.50 −11, 064 959 708 5, 830
2.00 −12, 433 951 253 6, 670
3.00 −11, 325 855 −554 7, 600
4.00 −8, 810 699 −1, 358 7, 560
5.00 −7, 166 452 −2, 110 6, 860
Note: Units are thousands of persons for employment and 2009 U.S. dollars for wages.
We simulate the gains or losses of employment in each sector in response to the 1% fiscal
spending shock by the new dynamic path point estimate minus deterministic path with
no structural shocks.
29
Table 2. h-Period ahead Out-of-Sample Forecast for Employment
(a) Private Jobs
Gov’t Spending Profits Productivity Private GDP
h RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW
1 1.021 3.463 1.017 1.358 0.977 −2.435 1.006 0.283
2 1.016 2.235 1.005 0.542 0.978 −2.750 1.000 0.019
3 1.012 1.421 0.996 −0.743 0.982 −2.623 0.997 −0.220
4 1.009 0.998 0.989 −2.505 0.987 −2.421 0.996 −0.404
5 1.006 0.648 0.986 −4.002 0.992 −1.910 0.996 −0.470
6 1.005 0.561 0.983 −3.751 0.997 −0.794 0.997 −0.462
7 1.006 0.694 0.984 −3.193 1.003 1.397 0.998 −0.439
8 1.008 0.932 0.986 −2.335 1.008 4.051 0.999 −0.181
9 1.008 0.896 0.991 −1.290 1.013 5.059 1.001 0.475
10 1.011 1.215 0.999 −0.165 1.018 5.222 1.004 2.261
11 1.017 1.913 1.009 0.930 1.025 4.960 1.010 3.417
12 1.024 2.388 1.021 1.980 1.034 4.887 1.020 3.685
(b) Government Jobs
Gov’t Spending Profits Productivity Private GDP
h RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW
1 1.014 1.098 0.994 −0.614 0.962 −1.322 1.039 0.708
2 1.022 1.500 0.986 −1.128 0.923 −2.297 1.087 1.283
3 1.021 1.514 0.979 −1.749 0.889 −3.838 1.127 1.580
4 1.009 0.723 0.976 −2.604 0.866 −4.401 1.186 2.633
5 0.991 −0.635 0.974 −3.260 0.864 −4.042 1.230 3.249
6 0.963 −2.183 0.971 −3.826 0.877 −3.748 1.301 4.514
7 0.931 −3.481 0.968 −3.609 0.892 −3.431 1.368 6.859
8 0.896 −4.783 0.958 −3.553 0.913 −2.689 1.413 8.779
9 0.866 −6.929 0.939 −3.805 0.943 −1.742 1.413 9.463
10 0.837 −6.272 0.913 −4.420 0.979 −0.594 1.401 9.875
11 0.816 −8.834 0.890 −5.195 1.008 0.245 1.359 10.008
12 0.799 −7.530 0.864 −6.707 1.027 0.766 1.309 9.637
Note: RRMSPE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared prediction errors, which
is the mean squared prediction error (RMSPE ) from the benchmark AR(1) type model
divided by the RMSPE from the competing augmented forecasting model. DMW is
the Diebold-Mariano-West statistics. DMW statistics in bold is cases the competing
model significantly outpeforms the benchmakr model at the 5% level. Critical values
are from McCracken (2007) for rolling window schemes with a 50% split point. We
repeat estimations and forecasting starting from the first 50% observations by adding and
dropping one observation, maintaing the same number of observations in each iteration,
until we (out-of-sample) forecast the last observation of the target variable. We demeaned
and detrended all data prior to estimations.
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Table 3. h-Period ahead Out-of-Sample Forecast for Wages
(a) Private Wages
Gov’t Spending Profits Productivity Private GDP
h RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW
1 0.995 −0.420 1.002 0.313 0.996 −0.888 1.017 0.649
2 0.988 −0.624 0.994 −0.890 0.975 −3.669 1.022 0.802
3 0.981 −0.958 0.986 −1.904 0.963 −4.744 1.018 0.677
4 0.979 −1.052 0.972 −3.627 0.955 −4.208 1.016 0.794
5 0.977 −1.195 0.963 −4.515 0.957 −5.146 1.008 0.330
6 0.974 −1.271 0.958 −6.254 0.963 −3.631 1.001 0.056
7 0.972 −1.693 0.953 −7.000 0.975 −2.054 0.991 −0.514
8 0.973 −1.280 0.953 −6.971 0.983 −1.336 0.999 −0.060
9 0.970 −1.704 0.946 −8.676 0.999 −0.176 0.995 −0.269
10 0.966 −1.914 0.942 −8.250 1.007 1.393 0.998 −0.125
11 0.972 −1.731 0.937 −9.623 1.011 2.256 1.005 0.284
12 0.978 −1.398 0.932 −8.265 1.012 2.324 1.010 0.535
(b) Government Wages
Gov’t Spending Profits Productivity Private GDP
h RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW RRMSPE DMW
1 0.918 −2.740 0.980 −0.511 0.973 −1.557 0.976 −1.719
2 0.831 −5.697 0.959 −0.917 0.948 −2.539 0.949 −3.323
3 0.784 −6.163 0.940 −1.302 0.922 −2.798 0.927 −3.484
4 0.739 −9.372 0.920 −2.202 0.901 −4.434 0.907 −5.848
5 0.732 −11.041 0.922 −2.238 0.890 −5.094 0.913 −5.237
6 0.713 −11.737 0.915 −2.618 0.878 −5.762 0.929 −4.721
7 0.702 −13.716 0.908 −3.241 0.860 −6.660 0.953 −2.764
8 0.688 −17.030 0.893 −4.417 0.850 −8.659 0.990 −0.633
9 0.679 −17.354 0.889 −5.107 0.843 −8.300 1.048 3.048
10 0.662 −17.919 0.881 −5.456 0.839 −8.998 1.116 6.753
11 0.642 −19.761 0.866 −6.853 0.829 −9.504 1.183 9.348
12 0.620 −21.858 0.854 −7.411 0.829 −10.960 1.267 13.411
Note: RRMSPE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared prediction errors, which
is the mean squared prediction error (RMSPE ) from the benchmark AR(1) type model
divided by the RMSPE from the competing augmented forecasting model. DMW is
the Diebold-Mariano-West statistics. DMW statistics in bold is cases the competing
model significantly outpeforms the benchmakr model at the 5% level. Critical values
are from McCracken (2007) for rolling window schemes with a 50% split point. We
repeat estimations and forecasting starting from the first 50% observations by adding and
dropping one observation, maintaing the same number of observations in each iteration,
until we (out-of-sample) forecast the last observation of the target variable. We demeaned
and detrended all data prior to estimations.
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